ALFREDO DI TILLIO
Monologues, Dialogues, and Common Priors, with Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet, Theoretical Economics, 17 (May 2022), pp. 587-615.
Strategic Sample Selection, with Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen, Econometrica, 89 (March 2021), pp. 911-953.
Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?, with Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen, The Economic Journal, 127 (October 2017), pp. F266-F304.
Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs, (Supplemental Appendix) with Yi-Chun Chen, Eduardo Faingold, and Siyang Xiong, The Review of Economic Studies, 84 (October 2017), pp. 1424-1471.
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms, with Nenad Kos and Matthias Messner, The Review of Economic Studies, 84 (January 2017), pp. 237-276.
Conditional Belief Types, with Joe Halpern and Dov Samet, Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (September 2014), pp. 253-268.
Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games, with Pierpaolo Battigalli and Dov Samet, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Tenth World Congress, Volume I, Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
The Predictive Role of Counterfactuals, with Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson, Theory and Decision, 74 (February 2013), pp. 167-182.
A Robustness Result for Rationalizable Implementation, Games and Economic Behavior, 72 (May 2011), 301-305.
Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information, with Pierpaolo Battigalli, Edoardo Grillo, and Antonio Penta, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 11 (January 2011).
Uniform Topologies on Types, with Yi-Chun Chen, Eduardo Faingold, and Siyang Xiong, Theoretical Economics 5 (September 2010), 445-478.
Subjective Expected Utility in Games, Theoretical Economics, 3 (September 2008), 287-323.
A Note on One-Shot Public Mediated Talk, Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (February 2004), 425-433.
Bounded Recall Strategies and Public Monitoring, April 2004.
Forward Induction and Admissibility in Repeated Coordination Games, July 2002.
Iterated Expectations with Common Belief, August 2001.